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SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY
been all too visible in most of the social sciences since their inception.
The way this dichotomy is put makes it clear that I consider it as unnecessary as it is dysfunctional, and the hope here is to articulate an intelligently balanced and integrated view. Certainly there are times in the development of a discipline when we have gone so far toward one or the other of these extremes that the cumulative processes of science are seriously jeopardized. Then, of course, it is time to shift our emphasis, attention, and resources in order to redress the imbalance. To put it cybernetically, we have no objections to fluctuations around a relatively stable "steady state," but when these perturbations are of appreciable duration and magnitude, they may end up requiring corrective feedback that is too extreme, lasts too long, and costs too dearly.
THE DATA-MODEL CONNECTION
One way to reduce the frequency and magnitude of these radical swings in scientific activity is to recognize the criticaland early-role that data play in mediating the continuous interaction between theoretical hunches and empirically testable models. On the basis of all sorts of things, from current folklore and idle fantasy to the hard evidence produced by prior investigations, the researcher formulates speculative schemes that might help to explain the phenomena of interest. But as these schemes take on coherence and plausibility, the social scientist begins to translate them into operational models that can be put to the test and checked out against the "real," referent world. This translation, in turn, rests heavily upon the strategies that will be used to generate the data that represent empirical reality. To put it another way, the concepts that go into the model have to be converted into operational indicators, so called because they make explicit the operations or procedures by which the phenomena of the referent world are expressed in sets of scientifically useful data.
The wide range of processes by which we make this conversion or translation from intellectual construct to machine-readable data set is quite broad, and will be described later. But they rest heavily on what might be thought of as instrumentation: The development of techniques and procedures by which we can observe phenomena that are not visible t o the naked eye. The same, of course, has been equally true of the physical and biological sciences; as Clark (1971: 109) noted in his biography of Einstein, "pure" science has always relied on measurement techniques in order to move forward. If we recall Kepler's need for Tycho Brahe's systematic observations and measurements, or Hershel's reliance on a more sensitive thermometer, or Michelson and Morley, whose mercury float and mirrors permitted them to demonstrate that "ether flow" had no effect on the movement of light rays, we find further grounds for concurring with Maxwell's statement that he was "happy in the knowledge of a good instrument maker." We know more about the physical and biological world today, Clark reminds us, "not because we have more imagination, but because we have better instruments." In the social sciences, where many of our explanatory concepts refer to symbolic behavior, intrapersonal processes, and other equally intangible phenomena, we need t o be even more creative and diligent in our instrumentation.
All of this is to emphasize that the scientific enterprise-be it carried out in the laboratory, the field setting, or in the reconstruction of history (Singer, 1977) -is equally dependent upon the big picture and the precise technique, creative explanation and meticulous description, uninhibited speculation and discplined measurement. We cannot construct and test models in the scientific sense of the word without data, and we cannot efficiently generate or acquire data without close attention to the models that we now have, and t o the theories we hope they will become (Deutsch, 1966 (Deutsch, , 1969 .
TOWARD A CLARIFICATION OF TERMS
While laymen and dictionaries may accept the proposition that data is merely the plural of datum, the scientific definition should be somewhat more stringent. That is, any item of factual or existential truth may well ba a datum: the Treaty of Versailles took effect in January 1920; the Japanese fleet was victorious in the Battle of Tsushima Straits; there are 154 sovereign states in the world today, and so forth. But a number of such existential statements would not constitute data until we had very clear and explicit coding rules by which we defined the effective date of treaties (relatively simple), victory in naval battles (less simple), and national sovereignty (even less simple). Without such criteria for coding and classifying, we cannot generate a set of data, and therefore cannot make a scientifically useful descriptive statement about some population of treaties, naval battles, or sovereign states.
Second, and closely related, is the matter of quantification. In each of these three examples, we can decide which cases are included or excluded without invoking any quantitative criteria; purely qualitative criteria will often suffice. While an appreciation of this truth often leads to the statement that one need not quantify to do scientific research, such reasoning is flawed. Even though we can assign each particular case, condition, or event to a given category without necessarily quantifying, the moment that we generalize about the set of cases, we must enumerate how many fall into each category. Thus, even if quantification is not essential-and often it is essential-for identifying a datum, it is always essential for describing the data set into which it falls.
While discussing matters definitional, let us also deal with two labels that are sometimes applied to macrosocial data sets. One of these is "aggregate data" which, if taken literally, would apply to sets of data that describe groupings or populations without describing the individuals or small units that constitute the aggregation. These are summed or averaged scores for the aggregation, but not the scores for its individual components, leaving us in the dark as to how the characteristics are distributed within the aggregated population. But since scientists can (in the aggregate!) be as imprecise in their terminology as journalists, public officials, and laymen, we often see the label applied to any data set other than the tabulation of election results or opinion surveys. However, since most of these data sets only have the aggregated results of the election or survey, and nothing on the specific individuals were involved, it is unsettling t o see them set apart and labeled as something distinctly different from aggregate data! There are, of course, important differences between these and other data sets, but rarely does the aggregatedl disaggregated dimension capture it. In practice, then, all too many of us use the label t o describe a residual category, a nondifferentiated melange. Some lump everything that is not based on the observation of individual human traits or behaviors into the aggregate data category, while still others use it t o include quantitative data produced by governmental or commercial organizations for their policy purposes, rather than by social scientists for research purposes.
Another label-more recently coined but equally imprecise-is that of "process produced" data, by which is usually meant the latter-mentioned type of aggregate data. Since all data sets, by definition, are produced by some sort of intellectual and social process, it is not particularly useful t o include corporate earning reports or governmental estimates of unemployment, but to exclude election votes or public opinion distributions. In the paragraphs that follow, we suggest a typology that rests on rather different dimensions, leading, we trust to a more precise and useful set of categories.
A PROPOSED TYPOLOGY OF DATA
Having rejected some of the more misleading labels and definitions, we should propose some alternatives, and we d o this in the context of a proposed typology of social science data. As we see it, a useful typology must deal with at least three dimensions along which the many types of data might be differentiated. The first dimension embraces the type of variable that we hope t o describe via our data set, or to put it another way, the concept that is represented by our data. The second is the level of aggregation at which the data-making observations are conducted. And the third is the procedure by which the observation is conducted and the data thereby generated.
SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY
To clarify these rather abstract statements, let us reiterate that any effort t o describe or explain a social process must begin with a number of concepts (Kerlinger, 1973: 28-29) . But those are only mental constructs. We can imagine them but we can seldom see, touch, or hold them; few of the variables with which we speak and think can be directly measured or scaled or categorized. Normally, these conditions or events cannot be directly observed because they are too intangible, or because they occurred so long ago or far away as to be out of sight, or are too spread out in time or in space, or comprise too many components to be observed simultaneously. Thus, we often have no choice but to observe carefully those conditions and events that are accessible to our direct senses, and then infer from them the value or state of the unobserved phenomenon. In other words, what we do observe is the indicator (or proxy, or representation) of what we would like t o observe, and the values or magnitudes manifested in our daia serve as indirect indicators of the fluctuating values of the concepts. To put it another way, we think and theorize in terms of concepts, and our data serve as convenient surrogates that represent them and can be subjected t o statistical analysis.
Turning, then, to our first dimension-the types of variable that the data set is supposed t o represent-we can identify three such types: the attributes of social entities, the relationships between and among entities, and the behaviors that these entities manifest vis-a-vis one another. By attribute we mean some property or characteristic of any social entity ranging from a single individual to the global system, and from a loose and transitory band of hunters or coalition of pressure groups, to a formal and meticulously organized corporation or national government. More specifically, any social entity may be described in terms of its physical, structural, or cultural attributes. By physical attributes, we mean the size of a person or group, the age profile of a nation or political party, the racial composition of a province or a professional association, the geography of a continent, the fertility of a nation's soil, the productivity of an industry, the range of a navy's guns, and so forth. While some of these physical attributes may be due t o the structural or cultural attributes (or the behavior) of certain groups, the distinction between cause and consequence must always be kept in mind. All too often, a physical attribute such as steel output, for example, is treated as a structural or cultural attribute because it is t o a great extent affected by the structure and culture of the nation.
As t o structural attributes, we have in mind the institutional and organizational arrangements and patterns by which sociologists, economists, and political scientists might describe a given social entity. Such concepts as social stratification, oligopoly, or bicameralism might be obvious examples; the first two are fairly informal and unofficial attributes of a system, whereas the latter would be formally institutionalized in legal documents. And while many structural attributes of an entity or system are inferred from the relationships and links between and among its component entities or subsystems, this hardly justifies the openended use of "structure" that we find in today's social science literature. Some use the word to embrace any set of social relationships among entities; others can mean statistical relationships among variables, recurrent historical patterns, and just about anything else for which no other word comes t o mind.
Cultural attributes can also cause confusion inasmuch as the word culture has been used t o describevirtually every attribute of a social entity, from its beliefs t o its behaviors and from its pottery t o its agricultural practices. We use it here in the more restricted sense of the distribution of perceptions, preferences, and predictions held by the people who comprise the entity; that is, beliefs about what is or was, what should be, and what will be (Singer, 1968) .
With these three sets of attribute dimensions, any social entity can be described, compared with itself across different points in time, and compared with any other entities. T o borrow from Gordon Allport's insightful distinction (1955), they permit us t o deal with our social entities in terms of both their being and becoming, but not their behaving, t o which we will attend after a look at the class of variables that falls between attributes and behavior: that of relationships among entities.
Unfortunately, the concept of relationship also has a multitude of meanings, of which only two concern us here. One sense is that of comparison: The relationship between the USSR and the United States in nuclear capabilities is that, for example, the Soviets have about 2500 strategic delivery vehicles versus 2000 for the United States, but only 7000 deliverable warheads versus 9200. When we are merely making a comparison between or among entities along a given attribute dimension, we will not speak of a relationship but of a coniparison. The second, more complex meaning-and the one that we will use here-is that of connections, links, bonds, and associations between and among entities. How interdependent, durable, cooperative, open, and so on is or was the relationship between or among some specified population of entities, groups, nations, and the like'?
The final class of variables, after the attributes of entities and the relationships among them, is that of behavior, which we use in its most literal form. What is a given entity doing, in the verbal or motor sense of the word? For example, is an individual speaking, a group of individuals negotiating, a pair of nations trading, an alliance of nations fighting a war? Note that we do not use behavior to include either changes in the attributes of an entity or in the internal conditions that might account for its behavior. That is, the brain cells may behave and interact when an individual expresses a thought, or individuals may converse prior to a group's acting, or bureaus may interact before an international organization condemns a member, and so forth. But this refers, in each case, to the behavior of a component, and not to the behavior of the entity itself.
We stress all of these distinctions not only because the vocabulary of social science is often imprecise, but because conceptual and semantic precision are essential t o valid indicator construction and systematic data generation. When we turn to the connections among concepts, their indicators, and the data sets that emerge from the application of these indicators, it will be clear that semantic idiosyncrasies can lead to considerable mischief and confusion.
S o much then, for the first dimension in our typology of data: the type of social phenomenon (attribute, relationship, or behavior) involved. The second dimension revolves around what is often called the level of analysis, or more accurately, the level of aggregation. In the above discussion, we have alluded occasionally to the distinction between a social entity and its component units or subentities, and we have inevitably spoken of entities that may range in size and complexity from the single individual up through the global system. Let us now address these distinctions in a more explicit and systematic manner, since they are as central to the validity of our index construction and data acquisition as are the distinctions between and among one's classes of variables (Singer, 1961; Moul, 1973) .
For most social science disciplines, this great variety of social entities can be arranged along a vertical axis, with the individual human being at the lower end and the global system at the upper. In between, and working upward, one thinks of primary groups, such as the family, the face-to-face work group, and the friendship clique. At the next level are such secondary groups as the extended family; bureaus of municipal, provincial, or national governments; offices of commercial firms, departments of universities, labor unions, and so forth. At a fourth level are the governments, firms, universities, and labor unions themselves. Next, might be such territorial and subnational entities as provinces or regions, and then nations themselves, followed by international or supranational coalitions, alliances, or formal organizations at the continental or global level. The specific grouping and the specific level of social aggregation is not particularly important for our purposes here, and one's choice of grouping and level will reflect the theoretical question at hand. But, as already intimated, after choosing one's outcome variable and the explanatory variables whose predictive or postdictive power is to be examined, one must be extremely precise in going about the construction of the indicators and the acquisition of the data. To put it in more formal language, the validity of the inferences we make in linking our indicators to our variables will rest heavily upon the appropriateness of the aggregation levels at which each is found, as well as upor the reasoning that lies behind the types of variables (attribute, relationship, or behavior) themselves.
With these preliminary (but by no means trivial) matters of epistemology and terminology behind us, we now turn to our primary assignment: the role of variables, indicators, and data in macropolitical research.
DATA ARE MADE, NOT BORN
While there are exceptions to the proposition that "data are made, not born," we will ignore them for the moment, on the grounds that the social sciences have paid a n exorbitant price by assuming that the only available data are "born data." As McClelland (1972: 36) reminds us, too much social science research has rested on data sets that have been "requisitioned" from some other source. To advance further, he suggests that we will have to go after more difficult data: "needed bodies of facts will have to be quarried by hand out of hard rock." While the metaphor may be overly stark, it emphasizes that we must sift through vast and messy bodies of disparate facts in order to produce neat and tidy data sets. Perhaps the panning of gold-in which the few cherished flakes and nuggets are separated from the abundant gravel and sand in the river bed-might be an equally appropriate metaphor.
Either way, the point is that we cannot expect the macrosocial sciences to advance if we rely primarily upon "requisitioned" data that are readily at hand. To the extent that we do follow that strategy-and thus acquiesce in the popular myth that social science is not "really" a science because most of its concepts are not readily measured or already found in quantitative form-we perpetuate our backward condition. We turn, therefore, to the procedures and reasoning that are followed in the the making or generating of macropolitical data. Following that, we can briefly identify some of the sources in which we find our data more nearly ready-made.
THE VALIDITY OF INDICATORS
In any discussion of indicators and their validity, we often use words like "proxy" and "surrogate," and thus call attention t o the fact that our data are not identical either to our conceptual variables or to "real world" phenomena, but are rather detectable traces of the latter and representations of the former. We utilize our data-via our indicators-to infer the presence and strength of our variable in a given real world, empirical setting. To emphasize the point further, try to imagine directly observing such attributes as the nationalism of an individual, the rationality of a decision unit, the centralization of a political party, the cohesiveness of an alliance, or the power of a n international organization. Similarly, how might we directly observe the existence or the strength of relationships such as a marriage between individuals, the hostility between ethnic groups, or the economic interdependence among nations?
Even behavior and interaction-the most visible and audible of our three classes of social phenomena-are seldom directly observable, at least in a scientifically useful sense. That is, we may see or hear reports of a revolution or a diplomatic visit or the making of a trade agreement, and we may witness some part of the event or episode. But even here, we or our informants only see or hear a small fraction of the behaviors and interaction sequences. And, as noted earlier, if these events occurred before we came on the scene, or across a wide area of space or span of time or behind closed doors, we can only piece together certain bits of information and then infer the occurrence of certain behaviors (Webb et al., 1966) .
The purpose of an indicator, then, is to help us generate a data set from whose magnitudes and values we can validly infer the values of the actual phenomena that interest us. While we suggested earlier that our data provide the observed values from which we infer the values and magnitudes of our unobserved variables, this can occasionally be an overstatement. If, for example, our variable is "severity of war," a perfectly reasonable indicator might be the number of fatalities "caused" by the war, and that should be observable. But a moment's reflection reminds us that, even if we could reliably discriminate between those fatalities that were caused by the war and those that were merely associated with it in time and space, the former number would itself not be directly observable. Rather we would first have to infer it from all sorts of reports and records, and then make the second inference from that number t o the conceptual variable called severity.
Similarly, in the electoral behavior field, it our variable is that of voters' attitudes toward the political parties in a campaign, we usually offer the voters the stimulus of a questionnaire, and from their oral responses we infer their opinions about certain attributes of the parties. From those inferred opinions, we go on to infer a general attitude toward the parties, and on occasion we even go to a third inference as to whether they will vote, and if so, for which party. In the social sciences, such examples of our reliance on inferential leaps are numerous, and their frequencyas well as their often heroic proportions-should make us attentive to ways in which we might ascertain the validity of our indicators.
By validity, we mean the extent to which our indicators bridge the gap between the referent world and the observed variable that is purported to represent the referent world: the extent to which they actually measure what we claim to measure (Kerlinger, 1973: 457) . While most scientists agree that the validity of an indicator is never fully demonstrated, there are four basic tests that help us t o estimate how close we have come. First, there is "face validity," by which we mean that most other specialists agree that the indicator seems to get at the concept it allegedly represents. In more refined terms, face validity rests on the plausibility of the reasoning behind the indicator: Why should we expect it to tap the concept we have in mind? A somewhat pretentious label for that reasoning is the "auxiliary theory" (Blalock, 1968) , but since it would be naive to expect, and costly to construct, a genuine theory to buttress every indicator we use, we prefer to stay with reasoning or rationale.
In addition to this intuitive criterion of face validity, there are three empirical tests that may be involved. The most direct is that of carrying out the operations called for by the indicator and then examining the scores that result. To the extent that they coincide with what we and other specialists expected, the indicator's alleged validity is further enhanced. Next, we can ascertain how strongly the indicator at hand correlates with a well-established alternative indicator of the same phenomenon (Campbell and Fiske, 1959) . Suppose, for example, one were using the number and rank of officerships in universal intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as an indicator of a nation's "diplomatic importance," but wanted to go back to 1820, a century prior t o the League of Nations. One solution might be to use instead the number and rank of diplomatic missions sent to each nation's capital by all the other nations in the system (Small and Singer, 1973) . If we found a high correlation between the IGO and the diplomatic scores for most of the nation-years since 1920, we would have greater confidence in the validity of the IGO officership indicator, given the fact that the diplomatic mission indicator not only seems reasonable, but produces scores that also seem reasonable.
But this test also has its weaknesses, one of which is the danger of spurious inference. To take another example, just because there happens t o be a strong and positive correlation between total population and other indicators of national power-and there usually is Rummel, 1972-one would not argue that population is a valid indicator of the concept. Not only are there many cases in which the correlation is weak, but there are even quite afew nations whose "power score" for certain periods will be negatively correlated with their population size. Examples of this pattern include nineteenth-and early twentiethcentury China and India, and modern Israel.
A third empirical test of an indicator's validity is its "criterion validity" (Kerlinger, 1973: 459) , or its performance in the context of a well-supported theoretical model. If the variable that it allegedly taps is, according to the model, supposed to rise or fall in a certain correspondence with another variable (the validity of wnose indicator is generally accepted), and it indeed rises and falls as it should, many would consider it quite valid. But given how few solid theories there are in political science (or economics or sociology) this could be a very unsatisfactory test. The chances of the suspect indicator being invalid are certainly no less than the chances of the "theory" itself being wrong. And, of course, the accepted indicators with which the new one is supposed t o covary could, themselves, turn out to be less than valid reflectors of the variable they allegedly tap.
THE RELIABILITY OF INDICATORS
While social~scientists must, of necessity, devote a great deal of attention to the validity of their indicators, and even more t o the analysis of the data generated via these indicators, we often tend toward the cavalier when it comes to the quality of the information upon which these more interesting activities must ultimately rest. The problem of "data quality control" (Naroll, 1962 ) is all too often relegated directly to our data collection assistants and indirectly to the historians, archivists, clerks, biographers, and journalists who generated and assembled the raw material from which we begin. This quality problem can be viewed as two subproblems: the reliability of the indicators that convert the facts into data, and the accuracy (and completeness) of the facts t o which the indicator's operations are applied.
As to reliability, we mean the extent t o which we come up with the same scores when the same procedures are applied by the same coders to the same factual materials over and over, or by different coders at the same or differing times. The former is known as test-retest reliability and the latter as intercoder reliability. Both are primarily a function of the clarity, explicitness, and precision of the coding rules; the less the ambiguity in these rules, the higher will be the reliability of the indicator and the higher the probability that our coders are detecting. selecting, classifying, and recording the facts as intended by those who developed the indicator. To put it another way, the coding rules describe the operations by which the raw recorded traces of empirical reality are converted into scientifically useful data.
Perhaps the most typical procedures for such conversion are those known, somewhat misleadingly, as "content analysis" (Pool, 1959; Berelson, 1952; Holsti, 1969; and North et al., 1963) . We say misleading because it is not an analysis procedure at all, but one for generating data. In any event, the procedure is designed t o sift through a tremendous body of written materials in order to identify certain patterns that would otherwise remain lost. Without imaginative and rigorous procedures, the empirical "gold" that we seek would remain obscured by all the associated verbiage that is not relevant to the patterns we seek, but within which the rare items are embedded.
The same basic principles are followed when we code and classify events and conditions that unfold in the natural world, or that have already been more impressionistically recorded by historians or on-the-spot observers in years gone by. In any utilization of the content analysis approach, the same principles apply: We articulate our concepts, operationalize them, set up our coding rules, and count the frequency with which indicators of variables appear. The major drawback of this method, especially when applied to large amounts of material, is that it takes a long time. Electronic computers are now used for tabulating and sorting the results via such programs as the General Inquirer (Stone et al., 1966) , but the basic assignment of words, phrases, and themes to a given category must still be done by the human eye, mind, and hand. It may be, however, that we will soon have electronic optical scanners, which, when programmed with the coding rules, will be able to "read" thousands of pages very quickly and count-when found in the specified context-the frequencies of the words and phrases that interest us in a particular study.
If, for example, we suspected that a government had gradually become more willing to negotiate an arms reduction agreement without insisting on on-site inspection, but had never explicitly expressed that shift, a careful coding of its articulations might reveal a declining frequency of references to such inspection. Of course, if a decline were found, it could reflect mere carelessness, an effort to engage in tacit bargaining, or perhaps even an attempt to bypass certain domestic elements that might oppose the policy shift, were it made explicit. The need for careful inference always remains.
Alternatively, a subtle and gradual shift in mood could be unwittingly communicated if a political group's statements revealed, via content analysis, a changing ratio of hostile and friendly adverbs and adjectives when dealing with certain other groups. Even more subtle, albeit intended, could be a regime's effort to deemphasize the dangers of radioactive fallout in its domestic press, as a stratagem for preparing its citizens for a resumption of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere (Singer, 1963) .
The point is that we can use such data-generating procedures to magnify certain information and ignore other information, and to detect certain obscure "signals" that might otherwise be lost in a sea of "noise." And the principle is the same whether we code historical narratives in order to detect certain classes of ever:ts (Merritt, 1966) , newspapers to detect changingreliance on certain political strategies, or legislative debates to detect shifting political values (Namenworth and Lasswell, 1970) . The procedures and rationale are dealt with more fully in the specialized literature, but enough has been said here to make clear the need for a well-conceived research design and a carefully constructed set of rules by which the coders will detect, classify, and record only what is intended by the researcher. If designed and executed carefully, the content analysis procedure can generate highly reliable data, and thus reduce our reliance on impressionistic or highly selective interpretation of a wide variety of written (and pictorial or graphic) materials. And, as already suggested, the reasoning and procedures are virtually identical, whether we are sifting through official statements in search of certain symbolic themes, through newspaper reports in search of certain economic traces, or through historians' monographs in search of certain behavioral patterns.
THEACCURACYOFDATASOURCES
While the political scientist can-through competence, resourcefulness, and diligence-eventually solve most problems connected with indicator reliability, the accuracy of the source materials to which our indicators are applied often lies beyond our control. In those cases, we can only eschew perfection, and adapt t o the unpleasant realities in a thoughtful, creative, and frank fashion (Morgenstern, 1963) . Let us illustrate the problem by reference to certain types of data sources and suggest a few of the strategies for dealing with them.
There would seem to be three basic types of error in the factual materials with which we work, and each calls for a slightly different response. The most serious is the systematic distortion of the facts, due either to some fundamental but unintended flaw in the original procedures for observation and reportage, or to the desire of the compilers or editors to mislead the potential user. In the former category might be a set of putatively complete trade figures, but with transshipped products omitted, or military personnel figures that exclude national police or border guards without so indicating.
More likely to be intentional would be an official chronology of major power conflicts, in which all the other nations' allies are also included, but not those of the compiler nation, or military budgets in which the compiler includes supplementary appropriations for the other governments but not for his own. These possibilities of systematic distortion, intended or not, remind us of the importance of familiarity with the historical context, the relevant literature, alternative sources, the bookkeeping practices employed, and statistical techniques by which to compare various sets of distributions. Needless to say, the researcher's failure to discern systematic bias in the data sources will produce badly distorted data, and thus highly dubious findings.
The second problem is that of random errors, often resulting from carelessness, naivetk, and incompetence at the origin or in the reportage, or in typographical and transcribing errors, or even in efforts to correct for systematic error. Normally referred to in the aggregate as "measurement error," these random inaccuracies often cancel one another out and may even have no discernible effect on the results that emerge from subsequent analyses of the data. More likely, however, there will be some effect, and if the errors are in the sources of the outcome variable data, we will merely get a poorer fit between our theoretical model and the observed regularities. But if the errors lie in data sources on the predictor side, the effect could be somewhat more serious. Random error in the values of these "independent" variables will result in attenuation biases in their coefficients, and the greater this random error, the more nearly will their coefficients approach zero.
A third type of error in the sources to which we turn for data is that of incomplete compilations, either because the original observations were incomplete, or because some of them were lost or eliminated later on when the compilations were being made. An illustrative example is that of some class of government expenditure or activity, with certain nations in certain historical periods consistently falling into the "missing" category. Often we cannot tell whether that class of activity just did not occur, or whether it occurred but was not recorded. Another frequent example is the tendency of regimes that are bureaucratically underdeveloped to publish, or report to an international body, figures that are so obviously wide of the mark that they are omitted from any compilation that is undertaken.
Missing facts and estimates need not, however, necessarily lead to the "missing data problem"; there are several strategies for estimating the value of those points that are missing. The simplest is merely to make an "informal estimate," and while this method may well produce an accurate estimate, it rests on something less than a perfectly reproducible algorithm. Equally simple is the arithmetic interpolation or extrapolation, but the virtue of its reproducibility is offset by its neglect of all information other than the trend line along which it is presumed to fall. Slightly more complicated, when working with a cross-temporal series, is to calculate the interpolated or extrapolated entries via simple statistical regression if the trend is linear, and polynomial or logarithmic regression if the trend is more complex. And if there is no clearly visible overall trend, but a fairly high degree of autocorrelation, autoregression models can be used (Nelson, 1973) . Somewhat more complex, but quite justifiable, is to take another series for which we have a relatively complete set of entries, and with which the incomplete series is highly correlated (positively or negatively), and then use statistical regression procedures to solve for the missing entries.
Other strategies can also be developed for making the estimates as accurate as possible, but regardless of the technique used, we must check its reliability by comparing the results with thevalues of a well-established data series that might be expected to correlate highly with the one at hand. Also important, if we make extensive use of missing data estimation techniques, is our need t o test the sensitivity of the data analysis results to the estimates used. This is readily accomplished by running the analyses with, and then without, the estimated cases, and if there is a discernible difference in the results, it is clear that the missing data estimates need to be reexamined, even if only to identify the systematic bias in the error source. This is not, however, to say that the estimates must be discarded. Since data points that are unavailable usually have more of a systematic bias than those that are available, they really could be deviant in their values and thus should be expected t o exercise a clear impact on one's analytic results.
If, despite the three types of inaccuracy (random, systematic, or missing) in a set of raw data, we decide that we have no choice but t o use the set nevertheless and then go ahead with one or more of the remedial procedures outlined above, two additional steps may be considered. One is to correct the obtainedlestimated values to a lower level of measurement: from ratio to interval, from interval t o ordinal, and in extremis, from ordinal to nominal. In principle, if the inaccuracies are not too severe, this procedure will generally discard the more erroneous information, but preserve that which is essentially correct.
Similarly, if we are working with time series, we can smooth out the trend line by the use of the moving average. This procedure treats each individual observation as unjustifiably precise in appearance, and hedges by combining it with one or two of the readings just before and just after, using the average of those three or five readings. Needless t o say, the moving average solution, while eliminating misplaced precision and giving us a smoother set of values with smaller and fewer perturbations, leads inevitably to a marked increase in the autocorrelation coefficient. As a result, if one were interested in the interobservation differences-such as in arms race analyses or in evaluations of the short-term effects of a policy change-these smoothing procedures would be highly inappropriate.
Before leaving this matter of factual accuracy, there is the unavoidable issue of the so-called confidence interval, and I approach it with some trepidation. Those who have done a fair amount of indicator construction and data generation are often asked to attach some numerical value to the accuracy of the data generated from one or another data source. One possible response might be to provide as honest an estimate as we can, indicating what fraction of the data points fall within each of several error ranges. This would require three distinct calculations. First, how far off could each point in each series possibly be? Second, how probable is that extreme error, and how probable are the descending error ranges as we approach perfect accuracy? And, third, for a given data set, made up of several series, what fraction of the points falls into each ofthose probable error and/ or confidence intervals? If we could intelligently make the first two estimates, it would be a simple matter to combine them into a single index of accuracy, such as the "standard error" of an observation, or perhaps even a Gini-like index. But experience suggests that steps one and two would not only be very time-consuming, but also could result in a misleadingly precise representation of a highly subjective and impressionistic process.
A more modest indicator of the data generator's confidenceadapted from the weapons technology community-might also be worth examining. When a large salvo of missiles is fired, accuracy is expressed in terms of "circular error, probable," indicating the radius of a circle within which half of the missiles could be expected to fall. In the same vein, we could ask how many standard deviations out from the mean of the distribution curve we would have t o go to capture half of the points in the series. If either of these methods has been used in the macrosocial sciences, we have not encountered it.
A final point regarding the accuracy of our data, or the factual materials from which they are generated, concerns the uses to which the data will be put. We noted earlier that a data set based upon moving averages, interpolations, and other smoothing procedures will suppress or eliminate the temporal fluctuations that could be critical to certain types of investigation. The point is that every data set that rests upon multiple sources will require certain internal adjustments, even if only to achieve comparability across actors and observation points on a given dimension. While this should cause no concern to the social scientist, it could make many data sets quite useless to the historian. But since the latter usually focus on a limited number of actors or years-while introducing an impressive number of variables and thus ending up with a poor N / V ratio (Deutsch et al., 1965 )-they are unlikely t o turn to a large data matrix when they need only a few of its cells. They are also wise in not doing so.
Thus, every data set must be examined closely, along with the coding rules by which it was generated, prior to its use in systematic analysis. This is not, however, to agree with the assertion that one must only generate one's data after formulating the research design. A given data set can-and should-be utilized for an appreciable array of investigations reflecting a diversity of theoretical orientations, and the idea of tailor-made data for each theoretical problem and orientation is errant nonsense. Not only would (and does) such practice make for gross inefficiency in the social sciences, but it also drastically impedes cumulativeness, since each study could end up resting upon a slightly different data base, making comparison and synthesis highly questionable (Leng and Singer, 1970) . Moreover, it would lend support to the suspicion-already accepted by many of our critics-that we carefully select our data and tailor our indicators in order to assure the statistical results that accord with our "theories."
SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY
DATA GENERATION VIA INDICATOR CONSTRUCTION
In the previous section, we have examined the criteria that need t o be approximated-if not fully satisfied-in the construction of indicators, and the way in which they areused to generate the data that represent the changing values or magnitudes of a variable. Bearing both activities in mind, let us shift now from these general considerations to a number of specific data generation problems. The plan here is to illustrate the wide range of data sources and data-making procedures in the context of our three types of variables: attributes, relationships, and behaviors.
INDICATORS OF ATTRIBUTES
We illustrate first with attributes, not only because they arethe most familiar and usually require less in the way of heroic inferences than do indicators of relationships behaviors, but also because-paradoxically-constructing indicators of attributes can lead to more problems of conceptual slippage than with those of relationships and behaviors.
To illustrate, suppose that a key attribute in a planned investigation is the "diplomatic importance" of nations, to which we alluded earlier. How might we go about measuring such an attribute in a reliable fashion, and what sort of indicator would be valid for a wide variety of nation types across perhaps a century and a half? The most obvious indicator would probably be one that rests upon the verbal behavior of diplomats, calling for them t o rank today's nations in response t o certain questionnaire items. But if we wanted to go back in time more than a few years, contemporary diplomats would not be very helpful; in that case, we might turn t o the expert judgments of diplomatic historians of the periods and regions of interest.
Leaving aside the cost in time and money for such a n opinion survey, it would suffer from the familiar flaws of all intuitive judgments, no matter how carefully stimulated, recorded, and combined. Within the population of respondents, there would be 203 VARIABLES, INDICATORS, A N D DATA a wide range of criteria as to how the nations' diplomatic importance should be evaluated, with some thinking largely in terms of military or industrial capability, others relying on protocol or conference participation or diplomatic visits, and still others trying t o recall which nations most regularly "had their own way" in the various regions and periods. Even if provided with explicit criteria, our respondents would be inclined t o reinterpret or modify them between start and finish, either unconsciously or because of their belief that we should not use the same ones for such varying nations or periods. Further, since our historians will normally be truly expert in rather narrow bands of time and space, they will bring highly detailed knowledge to bear only within the intersection of those bands, and considerably less to bear in evaluating or scaling nations in other regions and periods. Yet another source of inconsistency might be the moment at which the interview or questionnaire was used: Has a recently encountered article or document left the strong impression that Austria-Hungary was overrated by the other powers in the 1890s, for example? Would an earlier or later interview produce a different estimate? In sum, threats to consistency across judges and across time, and hence to reliability would, along with the logistical problems, be disabling, even if the researcher's instrument were carefully designed t o maximize the validity of the responses.
Wisely rejecting expert opinion as a basis for estimating the diplomatic importance of nations, the researcher might turn to a less expensive and more reliable method: content analysis of a carefully drawn sample of books or monographs on the relevant time-space intersections. With a good library, explicit criteria as t o what is meant by the concept of diplomatic importance, precise instructions as to which passages t o read and how to classify certain types of statements, and well-trained and thorough coders, this could be a highly satisfactory procedure for generating diplomatic importance scores. The major advantage here is that we secure the more stable judgments of our experts without the trouble and expense of interviewing live subjects merely by going through their writings and systematically recording all of their statements regarding the diplomatic importance of the nations with which they were dealing in each study. If we are trying t o generate data reflectinga concept that is widely used and whose definition-however pre-operational-is widely shared, the content analysis strategy is surely preferable to that of questionnaires or interviews. But if major time-space domains have been ignored in the literature, or if the concept at hand is neither widely used nor consistently defined, content analysis of scholarly works will not suffice.
A closely related research option might be to content analyze, not the writings of scholars, but the writings of those whose role it is to observe and comment on foreign affairs as they unfold: journalists, columnists, and editors. There are and have been newspapers with good coverage of foreign affairs in every region of the world, and there are copies of these papers going back many decades, if not centuries. Moreover, given the shared perceptions and the inevitable symbiotic relationship between the elite press and the political elites, it is reasonable to infer that the press (especially on the editorial page) will provide, over the long run, a fair expression of the elite consensus in each nation regarding the relative diplomatic importance of most of the nations in the international system.
Yet another possibility might be to code the diplomatic communications among the world's foreign ministries or between the ministries and their embassies and legations, but at least two factors would argue against this source of data. One is that evaluative statements regarding the relative importance of other nations seem t o be relatively rare in these communications. The other is that newspaper files are considerably more available and accessible than the diplomatic archives, if the written trace is our preferred vehicle.
But as the previous section reminds us, there may be alternative vehicles for getting at our concept, and if they look as if they might be less costly and time consuming-as well as equally strong on the validity and reliability dimensions-they may be preferable. That we (Small and Singer, 1973) so thought when faced with the need t o measure diplomatic importance is clear from the fact we indeed selected the bureaucratic-behavioral trace of diplomatic missions. The "auxiliary theory" or line of reasoning is quite simple. For reasons of economy, tradition, personnel limits, and so forth-as well as for policy reasons-the typical government over the last 150 years has established diplomatic missions in only about 45% of the world's capital cities, with 55% of them ignored. This produces, in effect, an ongoing plebiscite in which all the nations are continuously "voting with their missions" as to which of the others are more or less important to them. While some of the individual decisions may be quixotic, the net effect when all these decisions are aggregated year after year provides us with a collective judgment on the part of those who decide where their nations' primary interests lay.
Although the face validity of this attribute indicator (reflecting both the reasoning behind it and the rankings that it produces), and its correlational validity vis-a-vis the international organization officerships mentioned earlier are reassuring, it is too soon to tell whether its role in a well-founded theory will further enhance our confidence in it. While awaiting that particular test of validity, a reasonable researcher would certainly go ahead and use it, but with the prudence that should accompany the use of any less-than-proven instrument, along with the knowledge that it may well contribute to the very growth of theory that will permit its most demanding tests.
Despite the apparent indirectness of the above indicator, the number of inferential steps from conceptual variable t o indicator t o data can be even greater. Let us illustrate this via an attribute of the international system's structure, using an indicator that reflects a distribution of national attributes, rather than a directly observable attribute of the system per se. In the classical literature, we often find the proposition that peace is preserved by maintaining approximate parity among the major powers, and by avoiding conditions of preponderance. The closer the distribution of capabilities is t o perfect equality, the less the likelihood of war, and the closer that distribution is t o pure monopoly, the greater the likelihood of war. To test that very plausible proposition, one would first have to develop an indicator of major power capabilities, and then develop an indicator of the extent t o which they are concentrated in the hands of a small number of powers. A multidimensional indicator now in use (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972) and whose validity seems quite adequate, is based upon: population (total and urban); industrial activity (energy consumed and steel produced); and military preparedness (armed forces size and expenditures). First, we have t o acquire-requisition would surely underestimate the difficulty-the raw facts for each nation in each year on each of the six dimensions, using national government statistics, summaries prepared by international organizations, commercial yearbooks, scholarly monographs, and (in extremis) unpublished archival materials.
Once these raw facts have been transformed into comparable data series, we convert the absolute values into each nation's percentage share of the total. Thus, if there are five major powers in the system in a given year, and each holds precisely 20% of the overall capabilities, the distribution is equal, and the concentration score is therefore zero. Conversely, if one or two of them hold the lion's share, making for something akin to monopoly or duopoly, we would get a very high concentration score. Of course, the pattern usually lies between these extremes, and in any case we calculate the indicator's value using the (Ray and Singer, 1973) formula:
Thus, to indicate the magnitude of this particular system attribute at a given moment, we begin with data on each nation's capability attributes, combine and weight them according to one or another theoretically persuasive formula (or perhaps even treat them as equally important), convert those absolute scores into percentage shares of the aggregation's total, and finally convert those shares into a single indicator summarizing the inequality of the distribution for that month or year. This is hardly an observation of a systemic attribute, but that is increasingly true as we move toward more realistic indicators of theoretically sophisticated concepts. Nor is there anything wrong with using such indicators, as long as the line of reasoning is very explicit and the cross-level inferences are empirically and logically justified; illustrative of such indicators of distribution are: Alker and Russett (1964); Cutright (1967) ; Duncan and Duncan (1955) ; Greenberg (1956); Hall and Tiedeman (1967); and Lieberson (1969) .
One may also get at certain structural properties of a complex system by using dyadic relationship or bondedness data. Macropolitical investigations rest quite often on notions of cleavage or fragmentation (Rae and Taylor, 1970) , segregation (Bell, 1954) , or polarization in the system at hand (Wallace, 1973; Bueno de Mesquita, 1975) , either as an outcome t o be explained or as an explanatory variable that might help account for the variation in some theoretically interesting outcome. In that case, we would first requisition, gather, or generate the data reflecting the presence and magnitude of a certain class of bond or link between each pair of entities that comprise the system at the time of each observation. This could be a relationship as constant and given as geographical distance, or one that reflects a consciously chosen and often changing bond, such as alliance commitments or commercial exchanges.
Here, the data would be entered into an actor-by-actor matrix in which every component entity is given both a row and a column. In the cell marking the intersection between A's row and N's column, the bondedness data are entered for every pair that is bonded on that dimension; for those pairs that have no such bond, a zero is entered. Once these data are entered into our computer files, we use one of a number of matrix (Guttman, 1968; Lingoes, 1973) or data reduction routines (Harmon, 1976) to ascertain the number of discernible clusters or poles, the depth of cleavage between clusters, the strength of the bondedness within them, and so forth. Further, depending on the theoretical question at hand, one may compare the configurations at successive times t o measure the direction and rate of change in them, or compare those reflecting two or more different types of bondedness (such as economic interdependence or political 208 SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY alignment) in order to tap the extent to which the different configurations reinforce or counteract one another.
INDICATORS OF RELATIONSHIPS
As already suggested, the word "relationship" in social science can have a multitude of meanings, and two of the possible meanings concern us here. One reflects the similarity of two entities along a given attribute or property dimension: the relationship between entities A and B in terms of their relative size, power, wealth, organizational complexity, cultural homogeneity, and the like. Strictly speaking, we should use such words as comparability or similarity in this connection, reserving "relationship" for links and associations that bond or relate them t o one another. Let us do so here, and explore some of the ways in which macropolitical relationships might be ascertained and measured.
While it is true that some attribute or property variables rest upon the relationship among the component units of the entity (and we return to that issue shortly), most ofthem tend to be more directly observable, or else inferable from data that are observable. But when we try to describe relationships, we are dealing not only with "the two-body problem," but with that most intangible of phenomena, a bond or link or association. Even addressing something as elusive as a cultural attribute (an organization's morale or a political party's credibility), there is some directly observable trace from which reasonable inferences may be drawn, but almost all inter-entity bonds are beyond direct observation. Unlike the bonds that connect physical or biological entities, those that connect social entities are largely symbolic and intangible.
Illustrative examples are contracts between commercial firms, treaties between nations, multilateral agreements linking international organizations to member governments, and so forth. In these cases, there is at least the written document that describes the bond. But equally important t o the student of comparative or international politics are those bonds and links that do not rest upon tangible documents but upon inherited or arranged understandings, or even upon historical concatenations that were never intended. For example, two nations may be found in the same grouping or cluster based on the fact that their diplomatic missions are in virtually the same capitals, or on their tendency to belong to the same international organizations. On the other hand, their membership in a given alliance cluster would not only be the result of more conscious choice, but would also be a condition of which its elites could hardly be unaware.
The above-mentioned relationships would normally be inferred from the close scanning of a bondedness matrix, in which every entity is listed in both a column and a row of the type of matrix described earlier, with the presence, absence, or strength of the bond connecting each pair shown in the cell marking the intersection of one's column with the other's row. Once the raw data reflecting these bonds had been acquired or generated, and entered into the matrix, we could use one of the several computerized decomposition algorithms t o ascertain which entities clustered together on that type of bond at that particular moment.
Yet another type of data that can be used for inferring relationships is that of interaction. While, as suggested earlier, there is often afailure to discriminate between these two classes of variable, conceptual precision in our data making-and thus our theory building-requires it to be made. By relationship, of course, we mean the sorts of bonds and associations referred to above, and by interaction, we mean behaviors that are directed toward, and responsive to, one another. While a relationship may affect interaction patterns (partners in a coalition government, for example, are likely to vote with the government on a confidence measure) and interactions may affect relationships (caurtship leading to marriage, negotiation leading t o a formal agreement, trade leading to a common market), they are clearly not the same phenomenon. Further, we may predict interaction patterns from a relationship (exchanging military plans on the basis of a defense pact) and a relationship from observed interaction (membership in opposing coalitions on the basis of conflictual behaviors). And, of course, we may infer the existence of a relationship from observed interactions (a most-favored nation agreement from the mutual reduction of tariff levels). Bearing these distinctions in mind, we turn to our third type of indicator: that reflecting behavior and/ or interaction.
INDICATORS OF BEHAVIOR AND INTERACTION
We suggested earlier that these phenomena are generally more visible than attributes or relationships, but this does not mean that it is necessarily easier to observe and measure them in the scientific sense. One reason for the difficulty in observation is that behavioral events occur rapidly, and if the observer is not on the scene at the precise moment, the action will be missed. And if they happen to occur very slowly, one would require a sequence of observers to relieve one another (Alger, 1966) . Also problematical are behavior and interactions that occur across so wide a swath of space that they are beyond our capacity to see, or otherwise sense. Thus, despite their tangibility (unless carried out in secrecy), interactions require us t o develop particularly ingenious indicators and sensitive strategies for picking up their traces.
The traces that are left by the behaviors and interaction of political entities can be sought in a variety of places. For nations vis-a-vis other nations, these might be the memoirs of, or (if our interest is in relatively recent events) interviews with the participants or close observers; diplomatic archives; foreign ministry chronologies; official records of international organizations; newspaper accounts; and the standard narrative monographs by historians working from these other sources. For legislative bodies, government ministries, political parties, or interest groups, the sources will not be that different: memoirs, interviews, newspaper accounts, official documents, and so forth.
Again, however, knowing where to look for the traces (or recollections) left by behavioral phenomena is only part of the game. Once the raw material has been located-if at all-the problem remains of converting what is essentially an undifferenti-ated welter of facts and impressions into scientifically usable data sets. In addition t o the issues discussed under basic procedures for the generation and extraction of data, there are two particular problems.
First, there is the conceptual distinction between behavior and interaction, and while it is seldom noted, our failure to do so can lead t o some foolish interpretations. The most dramatic example would be that of conflict escalation, in which there is a strong tendency for the observer t o assume that all belligerent moves by one party are directed toward, or are in response to, the selfevident opponent or adversary. Just as nations in an arms race may well be arming vis-a-vis third and fourth parties (Moll, 1974) -not to mention vis-a-vis a variety of domestic actors-all political actors attend t o several others simultaneously. Thus, rather than make an easy inference from the separate behaviors of an "obviously" interacting pair, it is essential that we begin by coding each party's behaviors separately, and only then ascertain the degree to which they constitute interaction. The existence of an obvious relationship is insufficient evidence, as is the mere temporal or geographical proximity of their separate behavior sequences. Usually, it is necessary to examine one facet or another of the respective decision processes prior to concluding that the behavior patterns constitute a literal interaction process.
The second problem with behavioral and interactional data sets is that we are never certain that the full population of events has been identified. Those who have tried to generalize about behavioral regularities only to discover that their generalizations rested upon an incomplete and highly skewed set of cases can appreciate this problem, but there seldom is any ironclad procedure for assuring a complete universe. When we deal with such behaviors as legislative roll-call votes or the cases before a court during a given session, the danger of missing any of the events is very low. But if our concern is with behavior that occurs in a less fully institutionalized environment, the probability of missing some of tile cases can be all too high. This is particularly true if the researcher is onlv interested in a subset of the population, such as only those inter-nation disputes in which military force was mobilized or deployed. In such asituation, how do we know whether the chroniclers, journalists, or historians might have omitted some or most of those qualifying cases because "nothing important" came to them? The standard solution here, when secondary materials are the only data source available, is t o code several of them, written from different perspectives in time as well as place and culture.
CONCLUSION: SOME MODEST PROPOSALS
Of all the skills that go into the growth of social science knowledge, the least developed is that of data generation. While data generation and index construction-like model building and data analysis-are not sufficient in themselves, they are absolutely necessary to the scientific enterprise. Yet the college and graduate school curricula seldom include courses on the subject, journal articles on it are extremely rare, there seem to be fewer than ten texts on the subject in English, and worst of all, most of the scores of texts on social science methods provide only a superficial glance at the problems and strategies associated with the generation of data. Further, whereas the philosophers of science have turned out reams on the ways in which t o interpret observed patterns, they have virtually ignored the processes by which the observations themselves might be carried out and recorded.
We might speculate as to the sources of this unfortunate asymmetry. D o we consider the acquisition of data so simple and obvious a task that "anyone" can do it? Or do we assume that it is best left to the historians? Or if the past holds no key to knowledge about the future, that journalists and bureaucrats and librarians can do the job for us? Perhaps we are all "closet theorists," persuaded that logic, elegance, and imagination are all we need to understand social phenomena? Or, to invoke a football metaphor, with the quarterback basking in the limelight, why become a guard? The possibilities are nearly endless, but far from reassuring.
Several solutions, in addition t o those implied above, come to mind, and an article on political research methods is surely the appropriate place to suggest a few of them. Despite a plethora of discouraging tendencies in the macrosocial sciences todayranging from such gimmickry as "evaluation research" and "futurology," t o increasing faith in pure cerebration, to perpetuation of the dubious fact-values dichotomy-there are several encouraging ones. Among these is the increasing interaction between social scientists and historians, reflected in the establishment of the Social Science History Association. The central objective, as we understand it, is to help social scientists become more longitudinal and historians t o become more scientific. In our view, this convergence holds considerable promise for both sets of disciplines, and perhaps even for an ultimately integrated science of human behavior. More particularly, political scientists, economists, and sociologists can profit by taking a more retrospective view of the phenomena that engage them, and can become more familiar with a greater diversity of cases from which t o generalize. But most germane here is a third possibility: that we will learn from them how to get at and then evaluate the incredibly rich variety of traces left to us by earlier generations. The interaction will, we hope, also lead historians to think nomothetically, both in the formulation of explanations and in the gathering of facts. Just as the social scientist needs to be more attentive to the intricacies of single episodes and the hidden secrets of half-forgotten artifacts, the historians can become sensitive t o the need for comparability in their facts and generality in their explanations.
Another possibility, also institutional, might be the establishment of a journal or annual (preferably multilingual) devoted to data generation and index construction in cross-national and international politics. Such a journal could help t o educate those who are unfamiliar with the methods and results in this sector, and help the more avant garde t o expand their repertoires. And it could signal the discipline's recognition that models without empirical evidence may be good fun, but incomplete science. Perhaps most importantly, it could create incentives, rewards, and legitimacy for those who might otherwise continue in the comfortable ways of waiting for the other fellow's data set, or of theorizing without data entirely. Another possibility, involving the foundations, comes to mind. Rather than continue to invest largely in research that is neither reproducible nor cumulative, perhaps one or two of these quasi-public institutions might be persuaded to establish a few centers whose primary task might be the generation, maintenance, and diffusion of data sets of potentially wide applicability. Such units as the International Relations Archive of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research have intermittently considered and even entered into such activities, but none has yet done so in a vigorous and sustained fashion because of the financial constraints, the difficulty of deciding which data sets would most be worth producing, and the absence of strong demand. Despite these constraints, and the lack of strong institutional support, we have nevertheless turned out a number of data collections, ranging widely in both substantive focus and scientific quality; among these are: Banks (1971), Banks and Textor (1963) , Morrison et al. (1972) , Russett et al. (1964) , Singer and Small (1972) , and Taylor and Hudson (1972) ; an excellent critique of several of them is Gurr (1974) .
Finally, those of us who teach and do research in the macrosocial sciences stand in need of some modest reforms. First, we can set a better example by increasing the inductive element in our own research mix, and by investing in the generation of more ambitious data sets. Second, when we write up our results, we can describe and justify our data-making procedures, eschewing the tendency to treat those activities as somehow too trivial to mention. Third, as teachers, we can break away from the stereotyping behavior that has kept us so data-poor: the early classification of our students, especially at the graduate level, as either "brilliant and creative theorists" or "competent, but plodding empiricists." This sort of practice discourages our most capable people from taking on the important and challenging work in indicator construction and data generation. Worse yet, it virtually assures the perpetuation of our peculiar two-culture problem, and makes it quite unlikely that we will begin to turn out what the discipline and the world need most: the complete social scientist.
